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Background: Biases in the interpretation of ambiguous material are central to cognitive
models of anxiety; however, understanding of the association between interpretation and
anxiety in childhood is limited. To address this, a prospective investigation of the stability
and specificity of anxious cognitions and anxiety and the relationship between these
factors was conducted. Method: Sixty-five children (10–11 years) from a community
sample completed measures of self-reported anxiety, depression, and conduct problems,
and responded to ambiguous stories at three time points over one-year. Results: Individual
differences in biases in interpretation of ambiguity (specifically “anticipated distress” and
“threat interpretation”) were stable over time. Furthermore, anticipated distress and threat
interpretation were specifically associated with anxiety symptoms. Distress anticipation
predicted change in anxiety symptoms over time. In contrast, anxiety scores predicted change
in threat interpretation over time. Conclusions: The results suggest that different cognitive
constructs may show different longitudinal links with anxiety. These preliminary findings
extend research and theory on anxious cognitions and their link with anxiety in children, and
suggest that these cognitive processes may be valuable targets for assessment and intervention.
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Introduction
Processing biases are central to the cognitive model of anxiety (e.g. Beck, Emery and
Greenberg, 1985). Specifically, a tendency to interpret increased threat and anticipate reduced
coping are thought to reinforce avoidant behaviour and anxious affect in a circular, self-
reinforcing manner. Based on this model, strategies to target these interpretation biases shape
treatments of anxious adults and children as young as 7 years of age (e.g. Barrett, Dadds
and Rapee, 1996; Kendall, 1994). However, although these biases are linked with anxiety in
children (e.g. Barrett, Rapee, Dadds and Ryan, 1996), evidence is lacking in relation to the
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degree of anxiety-specificity of associations, the temporal stability of “anxious cognitions”
and their associations with anxiety over time during childhood. This preliminary prospective
investigation examines the stability and anxiety-specificity of anxiety-related cognitive biases,
interpretation bias towards threat and anticipation of distress, and their longitudinal links with
anxious affect in late childhood.
Various paradigms have been used to assess interpretation biases in youth, including
interpretation of homophones, ambiguous facial expressions and, most commonly, ambiguous
stories (see e.g. Hadwin, Garner and Perez-Olivas, 2006). Within the latter paradigm,
individuals are presented with a series of scenarios in which it is not quite clear what is
happening and an interpretation is necessary. The finding that anxious children show (i) an
increased tendency to interpret threat and (ii) anticipate increased negative emotion compared
with their non-anxious peers has been widely replicated (Barrett et al., 1996; Bögels, and
Zigterman, 2000; Chorpita, Albano and Barlow, 1996; Muris, Luermans, Merckelbach and
Mayer, 2000; Muris, Merckelbach and Damsma, 2000; Muris, Rapee, Meesters, Shouten
and Geers, 2003). Whether or not these findings are specific to anxiety, however, remains
unclear. Indeed, few studies have included assessment of other psychosocial difficulties, and
where clinical comparison groups have been included, associations have not always been
specific to highly anxious groups. For example, Barrett et al. (1996) reported similar threat
interpretation biases amongst clinically anxious and oppositional youth, and Eley et al. (2008)
found that associations with negative interpretations were independently associated with
symptoms of depression but not anxiety. The current study adds to research conducted to date
by examining the anxiety-specific nature of both threat interpretation and anticipated distress,
and including assessments of anxiety, depression and behavioural problems. The inclusion of
anticipated distress is based on previous findings that anxiety is not only associated with threat
interpretation biases but also a tendency to anticipate negative emotional reactions in response
to ambiguity in comparison to non-anxious peers (e.g. Bögels and Zigterman, 2000).
Another important limitation of existing studies is the reliance on cross-sectional data; we
know little about the natural course of anxious cognitions in children and their association with
anxiety symptoms over time. Given the limited prior work, our developmental hypotheses
are guided by research in depressed and aggressive cognitions. One consistent finding from
the depression literature is that the association between cognitive style and symptoms of
depression may become more robust from middle childhood to mid-adolescence (e.g. Nolen-
Hoeksema, Girgus and Seligman, 1986; Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus and Seligman, 1992;
Turner and Cole, 1994). For example, Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1992) found that life events
but not cognitive style (in this case pessimistic explanatory style) predicted depressed affect
in 6-year-olds, whereas cognitive style did predict change in depressed affect in adolescence.
Furthermore, cognitions associated with aggression have been found to be more strongly
associated with aggressive behaviour in adolescence than in pre-adolescence, and behaviour
seemed to precede changes in beliefs until adolescence, when beliefs began to precede
changes in behaviour (Huesmann and Guerra, 1997; Lansford et al., 2006). The implication
is that cognitive style may manifest as, and act as a risk for, psychopathology once cognitive
styles become more stable with increasing cognitive maturity and/or experience.
Whether or not this developmental hypothesis extends to anxiety is unclear. For example,
cognitive biases in anxiety may represent a threat-detection mechanism that is an integral part
of the emotion of anxiety and not subject to comparable change (Taghavi, Neshat-Doost,
Moradi, Yule and Dalgleish, 1999) (i.e. cognitive bias would be strongly associated with
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anxiety across childhood because it is part of the phenomenology rather than a separate risk
for anxiety).
What is clear is that prospective investigations are needed that consider stability and change
in cognitive bias and affect without confounding age effects, i.e. by restricting samples
to narrow age ranges, and allowing for bi-directional associations. In relation to anxious
cognitions, we are aware of one study that has addressed some of these aims. Muris, Jacques
and Mayer (2004) conducted a 4-week prospective investigation, with children aged 9–13
years, of the association between anxiety symptoms and indices of threat perception. Their
results suggested that anxious cognitions were moderately stable over time; however there
was no evidence for a direct prospective association between threat perception and change in
anxiety symptoms over time. The authors questioned whether 4 weeks was a sufficient time-
period of assessment, and suggested a replication of the study over a longer time period to
increase the likelihood of clear changes in anxiety symptoms between assessments, and hence
greater potential to detect predictors of change. That is addressed in the current longitudinal
study, which followed children for a 1-year period and capitalized on a normative stress – the
transition to secondary school – to test hypotheses about the change over time in anxious
cognitions and emotion. This transition marks a time of change in school environment,
academic and social activities (Robinson, Garber and Hilsman, 1995) and has been associated
with increased psychological distress and problem behaviour (e.g. Robinson et al., 1995;
Chung, Elias and Schneider, 1998); it may therefore provide a natural experiment for assessing
intra-individual differences and exacerbation of anxious cognitions and affect.
In summary, we conducted a prospective longitudinal study to address the following
questions:
1) Are threat interpretation and distress anticipation specifically associated with anxiety
symptoms, in comparison to other indices of emotional and behavioural adjustment
(depression and oppositional behaviour)?
2) Are interpretation biases towards high threat and anticipation of high distress when
confronted with ambiguity stable over a 1-year period?
3) Does cognitive style, assessed prior to a naturalistic stressor, predict change in anxiety
symptoms in children after exposure to a major life event; is there evidence of a
bi-directional association?
Method
Sample
The participants were 65 children (30 boys and 35 girls) from UK year 6 (aged 10–11 years)
recruited from 14 mixed sex, state primary schools in North London. Full details of the
sample are provided elsewhere (Creswell, O’Connor and Brewin, 20061). In brief, the sample
represented 27% of the invited children; despite the low take-up rate the obtained sample was
representative of the invited group on gender composition, frequency of special-educational
1This formed part of a study addressing this question, and parental influences on the development of anxious
cognitions reported elsewhere (Creswell, O’Connor and Brewin, 2006) as such parental participation was also
required for children to be recruited to the study, which had a negative impact on participation rates.
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needs, and single-parent family status, but were more likely to be White-British (56%
versus 40%; χ2(2) = 6.18, p < .05) and less likely to be receiving free school meals (25%
versus 46%; χ2 (1) = 8.03, p < .005), response biases commonly observed in developmental
research.
Eleven of the children were not able to participate in the first follow-up phase of the study
(1 parent was deceased, 2 families were untraceable, 4 children declined, 4 parents declined),
leaving 54 (83%) children available at the time 2 assessment. For the third assessment, 49
(75%) families provided data. Participants and non-participants did not differ on any measures
at time 2. Compared with those who provided data at all time points, non-respondents at
the third phase did not differ on measures of anxiety but were more likely to have special
educational needs (29% non-responders vs. 8% responders; χ2 (1) = 5.39, p = 0.02) and
higher levels of conduct problems on the SDQ at time 1, t(63) = 2.46, p = .02.
Procedure
For the first two assessments, families who agreed to take part in the study were visited in their
home or school on two occasions by doctoral or masters level researchers with a background in
psychology and who had been trained on the administration of all measures. After being given
both written and verbal information about the study, mothers and children signed informed
consent forms. A researcher was present throughout completion of questionnaires in order to
introduce procedures, check understanding, and respond to queries. The third assessment was
carried out by post unless the families requested assistance completing the measures at home
(two families). Each family received payment at each assessment (£50 in total). The study
was approved by the University College London and University College London Hospital
Research Ethics Committee. The first assessment took place in the final half of the children’s
final year at primary school, the second assessment took place in the final half of the first
term at secondary school (5 months later) and the third in the final term of the first year at
secondary school (6 months later). The measures below were administered at all time points.
Measures
Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire (ASQ). Ambiguous scenarios questionnaires are
frequently used to assess interpretation of ambiguity and significant associations have
consistently been found with anxiety (see e.g. Hadwin et al., 2006). Following Barrett et al.
(1996) each child was presented with 12 ambiguous situations (6 physical and 6 social) that
could be interpreted as either threatening or non-threatening; situations were presented in
random order. Children were then asked to provide a free response to the question: “What
do you think is most likely to have happened?” Responses to this open-ended question were
scored by a psychology graduate who was blind to the child’s scores on other measures. Free
responses regarding the cause of the event were coded as “Threat” (e.g. “the dog is going to
bite me”) vs. “Non-Threat” (e.g. “the dog wants to play”) explanations. The number of Threat
responses was summed across the 12 situations (range 0–12). “Don’t know” responses from
the child were scored as “Non-Threat”. A second independent coder (psychology graduate)
coded a sample of the responses (n = 48) in order to assess inter-rater reliability. Intra class
correlation, assessed using Shrout and Fleiss’ third model for fixed raters (Shrout and Fleiss,
1979), was acceptable, ICC = .93, 95% CI.88−.96, F(47) = 27.59, p < .001. The child was
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then presented with a possible threatening and non-threatening explanation and was asked to
indicate which of two possibilities was more likely. Order of Threat and Non-Threat items
was counter-balanced across the 12 scenarios. The number of Threat choices was totalled
across the 12 situations. Responses from the free response and forced choice format Threat
questions correlated highly (time 1: r (65) = .80, p < .001; time 2: r(54) = .80, p < .001) so
were summed to create a total score for Threat.
In addition, the ambiguous scenarios questionnaire was modified to include a measure of
anticipated distress. For each situation, the child was asked to report on his/her anticipated
level of Distress (from 0–10) in that situation. A total score of Anticipated Distress was based
on the average score across the 12 situations (range 0–120). Internal reliability of the scale
was good (time 1 α = .82; time 2 α = .84; time 3 α = .92).
Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale (SCAS; Spence, 1998). The SCAS is a widely used
self-report questionnaire measuring symptoms of DSM-defined anxiety disorders in children
and adolescents. The scale contains 38 anxiety symptom items, as well as positive “filler”
items and an open response. Each item is measured on a 4-point scale from “never” (0) to
“always” (3). A total score is derived by summing all anxiety symptom scores. Scores are
also calculated for six subscales: generalized anxiety (e.g. “I worry that something bad will
happen”), separation anxiety (“I feel scared if I have to sleep on my own”), social phobia (“I
feel afraid that I will make a fool of myself in front of people”), panic and agoraphobia (“I
feel afraid of being in crowded places”), obsessive-compulsive (“I have to think of special
thoughts to stop bad things from happening”), and physical injury fears (“I am scared of
insects or spiders”). Spence (1997) reports robust internal properties of the scale. Internal
consistency was good (time 1 α = .89; time 2 α = .84; time 3 α = .93).
Child Depression Inventory (Long form) (CDI; Kovacs, 1979). The CDI is a widely used
self-report measure of depressive symptoms for children, with extensive support for its
reliability and validity (Kazdin, 1981; Saylor, Finch, Spirito and Bennett, 1984). The scale
comprises 27 items, in which the child selects one of three statements representing from a low
frequency of the particular depressive symptom (0) to a high frequency of the symptom (2).
Internal consistency was good (time 1 α = .80; time 2 α = .88; time 3 α = .87).
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire-self-report (SDQ-S; Goodman, 1997). The SDQ-
S is a child-self-report behavioural screening measure comprising five scales: emotional
symptoms, conduct problems, hyperactivity-inattention, peer problems, and pro-social, which
have been confirmed by factor analysis (Goodman, 2001). Satisfactory internal consistency,
cross-informant correlation and test-retest stability have been reported for children aged 11–
16 years (Goodman, 2001) and the SDQ is widely used within clinical research. Each sub-
scale is made up of five items, scored on a 3-point scale between “not true” (0) and “certainly
true” (2). The current study utilizes the “conduct problems” scale as a measure of oppositional
behaviour. Internal consistency was acceptable (time 1 α = .60; time 2 α = .60; time 3
α = .78).
Results
Correlations between ASQ Threat Interpretation and Anticipated Distress scores were gene-
rally modest (time 1, r(65) = .27, p = .03; time 2, r(54) = .20, p = .14; time 3, r(49) = .55,
196 C. Creswell and T. G. O’Connor
p < .001) and were therefore considered as separate constructs. Data were screened in
accordance with Tabachnick and Fidell’s (1996) recommendations for screening univariate
ungrouped data. One outlying data point was identified on child self-report on the CDI at
time 3, and hence was excluded from analyses involving this variable. Scores on the SDQ
were positively skewed at all time points, as was CDI at the first and second time point and
ASQ Threat at the third time point. Analyses involving these variables was replicated using
logarithmic or square root transformations as appropriate; all results were consistent with
those using untransformed data so are not given here (contact the first author for more details).
Associations between the key variables and demographic characteristics (gender, ethnicity,
eligibility for free school meals and registered special educational needs) were examined.
Non-White British children reported significantly greater symptoms and anxiety-related
cognitive biases at all three time points(Anxiety symptoms, time 1: t(63) = 2.30, p < .05;
time 2: t(52) = 3.44, p < .01; time 3: t(47) = 2.88, p < .01); ASQ Anticipated Distress: time
1: t(63) = 2.44, p < .05; time 2: t(52) = 2.18, p < .05; time 3: t(47) = 2.46, p < .05; Threat
Interpretation scores (time 1: t(65) = 2.15, p < .05; time 2: t(52) = 3.23, p < .01; time 3:
t(49) = 2.63, p < .05). Non-White British children also reported higher levels of conduct
problems at time 1 and 2 (time 1: t(63) = 2.46, p < .05; time 2: t(52) = 2.92, p < .01). Other
demographic variables did not have such consistent associations; however, at times 1 and 3
girls reported more anxiety symptoms (SCAS; time 1: t(63) = 1.97, p < .05; time 3: t(47) =
2.97, p < .05), ASQ anticipated distress (time 1: t(63) = 2.46, p < .05; time 3: 3.42, p < .005)
and ASQ threat interpretation at time 3 (t(47) = 2.10, p < .05) than boys. Accordingly, gender
and ethnicity were controlled for and interaction effects were explored in later analyses.
Specificity of the association between threat interpretation and distress to anxiety symptoms
Bivariate correlations between measures of cognition and affect at all time points are
presented in Table 1. Robust associations between Anticipated Distress from the ambiguous
situations questionnaire and anxiety symptoms (SCAS) were found, and remained statistically
significant after controlling for the number of tests (Bonferroni). It can be seen from both
cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses that the overlap between Anticipated Distress and
anxiety was consistently large, whereas the link with depression and conduct problems was
typically small, and non-significant after a Bonferroni correction. In contrast, associations
with Threat Interpretation appeared to be moderately associated with both anxiety and
depression; however this pattern was less consistent (Table 1), and after Bonferroni correction,
Threat Interpretation was only significantly associated with anxiety at time 2 and time 3.
Stability over time of interpretation bias towards threat and anticipation of distress.
Two types of change are evaluated to investigate the stability of cognitions and affect:
mean level change and change in rank order of individuals over time. As before, Bonferroni
corrections for statistical significance were applied to control for the number of tests
conducted. Table 2 displays the mean scores on the anxious affect and anxious cognition
measures. Repeated measures analyses, based on those participants where data were available
at all time points, indicated a significant mean change only for threat interpretation, F(2,41) =
8.01, p = .001, Effect size of change, γ = .40, representing a reduction in threat interpretation
between the pre (time 1) and post-transition (time 2) assessments. Bivariate correlations
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Table 1. Bivariate correlations between measures of cognitions and affect
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
ASQ Dis ASQ Th ASQ Dis ASQ Th ASQ Dis ASQ Th
Time 1
SCAS .53∗∗∗+ .23 .34∗ .19 .48∗∗∗+ .56∗∗∗+
CDI .27∗ .40∗∗ .11 .49∗∗ .14 .52∗∗
SDQ Con −.19 .31∗ −.21 .27∗ −.37∗∗ .04
Time 2
SCAS .54∗∗∗+ .30∗ .56∗∗∗+ .46∗∗∗+ .52∗∗∗+ .56∗∗∗+
CDI .07 .26 .06 .38∗∗ .17 .46∗∗
SDQ Con −.06 .36∗ −.09 .20 −.21 .19
Time 3
SCAS .58∗ .32 .54∗∗∗+ .37 .61∗∗∗+ .58∗∗∗+
CDIa .22 .29 .11 .46∗∗∗+ .22 .44∗∗
SDQ Con .13 .31 .21 .23 .06 .28
Notes: ASQ: Ambiguous Scenarios Questionnaire; Dis: Anticipated Distress, Th: Threat
Interpretation; SCAS: Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale; CDI: Children’s Depression
Inventory; SDQ Con: Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire Conduct Problems
subscale; + significant at p < .05 after Bonferonni correction (as significance values
below .001 are unspecified by statistical programmes, associations that were significant
at p < .001 were considered a close enough approximation to the criteria set); aoutlier
excluded. Time 1–Time 1, n = 65; Time 1–Time 2, n = 54; Time 1–Time 3, n = 49;
Time 2–Time 2, n = 54 ; Time 3 –Time 3, n = 49.
Table 2. Mean scores on measures of anxious cognitions and affect
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
n = 65 n = 54 n = 49
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range F (2,41)
ASQ Anticipated 51.00 (19.85) 19–95 51.22 (22.70) 0–101 47.63 (26.26) 0–96 .22
Distress
ASQ Threat 8.79 (4.72) 1–19 6.65 (4.84) 0–19 6.15 (5.52) 0–21 8.01∗∗∗
Interpretation
(composite)
SCAS 24.54 (12.28) 3–55 23.70 (10.55) 4–45 23.03 (14.20) 1–56 1.53
CDI 5.66 (4.79) 0–20 6.08 (5.62) 0–23 5.52 (5.21) 0–18 16.05∗∗∗
SDQ Con 2.04 (1.83) 0–6 1.72 (1.47) 0–5 2.00 (1.78) 0–7 1.36
Notes: ASQ: Ambiguous Scenarios Questionnaire; SCAS: Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale; CDI:
Children’s Depression Inventory; SDQ con: Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire Conduct Problems
subscale) ∗∗ p < .01; ∗∗∗ p < .001.
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Table 3. Predicting change in anxiety symptoms from ASQ anticipated
distress dependent variable: Time 2 anxiety symptomsa
Predictor B SE(B) β Increment in R2
Step one(control) .60
Time 1 SCAS .57 .08 .67∗∗∗
Gender 3.01 1.82 .15
White UK −3.54 1.90 −.17
Step two .04
Time 1 Anticipated .13 .05 .24∗
distress
Notes: ASQ: Ambiguous Scenarios Questionnaire; SCAS: Spence
Children’s Anxiety Scale; ∗ p <.05, ∗∗∗ p < .001; aoutlier excluded.
indicating a large effect size support stability of individual differences for measures of anxious
cognition and affect (time 1 – time 2: ASQ Distress: r(54) = .65, p < .001; ASQ Threat:
r(54) = .66, p < .001; SCAS: r(54) = .68, p < .001; time 1 – time 3: ASQ Distress: r(49) =
.57, p < .001; ASQ Threat: r(49) = .61, p < .001; SCAS: r(49) = .74, p < .001; time 2 –
time 3: ASQ Distress: r(43) = .69, p < .001; ASQ Threat: r(43) = .76, p < .001; SCAS:
r(43) = .82, p < .001). In addition, as seen in Table 2, the concurrent associations between
anxiety symptoms and anticipated distress were large and stable across time, r’s ranged from.
53 to.61. There was, however, a trend for the association between threat interpretation and
anxiety symptoms to increase over time (time 1: .23, time 2: .46, time 3: .58). Although not
significant (time 1 to time 2: z = .95, p = .17), this pattern does suggest that threat bias may
be less central to anxiety in younger children.
Longitudinal associations between cognitive style and in anxiety symptoms in children after
exposure to a major normative stress
Where bivariate correlations indicated a significant longitudinal relationship between
cognitions and anxiety symptoms (see Table 1), multiple regression analyses were conducted
to examine whether cognition predicted change in anxiety (i.e. predicted time 2 affect after
controlling for time 1 anxiety). Associations between cognitions prior to the transition and
anxiety shortly after (time 2) were investigated. To assess whether effects were maintained
over a longer period of time, associations between time 1 and time 3 were analyzed. There
were no significant interactions between gender or ethnicity and cognitions for any regression
analyses (although the study was not powered to detect interactions). Reverse relationships
were then investigated, i.e. whether earlier anxiety predicted later cognitions, following the
same structure as described above (time 1 to 2; time 1 to 3).
Time 1 Anxious cognitions and subsequent affect
There was only one significant bivariate correlation between cognition prior to the transition
and affect soon after: time 1 ASQ Distress and time 2 anxiety symptoms, r(54) = .54,
p < .001. Regression analyses indicated that time 1 Distress cognitions significantly predicted
time 2 anxiety symptoms, after controlling for gender, ethnicity and time 1 anxiety symptoms,
R2 = .67, F(4,48) = 24.03, p < .001; β = .24, p = .02 (see Table 3). The association
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Table 4. Predicting change in ASQ threat interpretation from anxiety
symptoms dependent variable: Time 3 ASQ threat
Predictor B SE(B) β Increment in R2
Step one(control) .50
Time 1 Threat .66 .13 .57∗∗∗
interpretation 3.39 1.16 .31∗∗
Gender −1.83 1.21 −.17
White UK
Step two .08
Time 1 SCAS .14 .05 .33∗∗
Notes: ASQ: Ambiguous Scenarios Questionnaire; SCAS: Spence
Children’s Anxiety Scale; ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001.
between anxious cognitions and subsequent affect was only slightly weaker at the subsequent
assessment, r(49) = .58, p < .001; (see Table 2). Although regression analysis did not support
a significant persisting association between time 1 Distress and change in anxiety symptoms
from time 1 to time 3, R2 = .58, F(4,44) = 17.71, p < .001; β = .17, p = .17, the magnitude
of effect was comparable (i.e..13 to.11). There were no significant associations between ASQ
Threat and later anxiety scores.
Time 1 affect and subsequent anxious cognitions
There were no significant associations between anxiety symptoms at time 1 and cognitions
at time 2 (i.e. over the transition event). On the other hand, there were significant bivariate
correlations between time 1 anxiety symptoms and time 3 Threat and Distress cognitions.
Time 1 anxiety symptoms significantly predicted time 3 Threat cognitions, after controlling
for time 1 Threat, ethnicity and gender, R2 = .55, F(4,44) = 15.39, p < .001; β = .33,
p = .005 (see Table 4). Time 1 anxiety symptoms did not, however, predict change in Distress
cognitions to time 3, R2 = .39, F(4,44) = 8.75, p < .001; β = .11, p = .44.
In summary, evidence of bi-directional links between cognitive bias and anxious affect was
observed, but differed for Anticipatory Distress – which predicted change in anxiety but was
not predicted by anxiety – and Threat – which was predicted by anxiety but did not predict
change in anxiety.
Discussion
We conducted a short-term longitudinal study of threat interpretation and anticipatory
distress and psychopathology symptoms to address three unresolved issues in developmental
research. The findings concerning specificity were reasonably clear across all three time-
points: there was a consistently significant association between threat interpretation and
anticipatory distress and anxiety symptoms that exceeded that found for depression or conduct
problems. Findings addressing the second question about stability were equally clear: there
was substantial stability of individual differences over the 1-year period; threat interpretation
but not anticipatory distress showed an age-based decline over this period covering the
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transition to secondary school. [Results also hinted that the link between threat interpretation
and anxiety symptoms may become stronger over time.] Finally, results addressing the third
question about change over time were less clear and robust: anticipatory distress did predict
an increase over time in anxiety symptoms; anxiety symptoms predicted an increase in
subsequent threat interpretation.
The high level of stability over time and consistent associations with anxiety symptoms for
Anticipated Distress supports the notion that this is a characteristic “style” that can be reliably
elicited from late primary school children. Threat interpretation was also a stable characteristic
within individuals, although its meaning vis-à-vis anxiety is less evident. Despite the longer
time period covered, test-retest correlations were somewhat higher for cognitive variables
than those reported from a community sample of 9–13 year olds (Muris et al., 2004) (.44–
.63). To establish whether this is a reliable difference requires replication, but studies of
depression and aggression in youth suggest differences in stability of beliefs at different
ages (e.g. Lochman and Dodge, 1994) which may account for differences between these
two studies; for example, the inclusion of slightly younger children in the Muris study may
have reduced the overall test-retest correlations. Notably, as a group there was a reduction
over time in the extent to which events were interpreted as threatening, with higher scores
at the pre-transition assessment than the post-transition assessment. Whether this represents
an effect of age, development or the forthcoming secondary school transition cannot be
disentangled by the current study, nor can potential confounding effects of characteristics
of the secondary school transition. For example, this finding, and the emergence of significant
associations between threat interpretation and anxiety in the post-transition assessments (i.e.
age 11/12 years), may be consistent with the suggestion that there is a general bias towards
threat information in childhood which non-anxious children learn to inhibit during mid-late
childhood but which remains amongst more anxious children (e.g. Kindt and van den Hout,
2001).
Longitudinal analyses showed that Anticipated Distress predicted change in anxiety
symptoms over time. In other words, children who anticipated a higher level of distress
in response to ambiguous scenarios reported a greater subsequent increase in their anxiety
symptoms. This is consistent with findings from treatment studies that suggest that anxious
self-statements (based on the Negative Affectivity Self Statement Questionnaire, which
includes items relating to both threat and distress) mediate change in the treatment of
anxiety (Kendall and Treadwell, 2007). Our findings, however, suggest that the specific
construct of anticipated distress may be particularly pertinent to the course of child anxiety
symptoms, as longitudinal investigations suggested that prior anxiety predicted change in
threat interpretation, and not vice versa. In children at this age, the concern that “a bad thing
may happen”, may be less influential on the development of anxiety than the concern that “I
won’t be able to cope with it”. If replicated, this pattern may have implications for assessment,
treatment and theory. For example, the observation that different cognitive components show
differential longitudinal links with anxiety may go some way to mapping the connections
between cognitive risk and symptoms and understanding which features are precursors versus
consequences of anxiety. It may be, for example, that anxiety is preceded by a general non-
specific wariness or inhibition, associated with a view that one will not be able to cope, that
is then subsequently accounted for by constructed explanations of internal experiences (i.e.
theories about bad things that could happen), which may only later serve to maintain anxiety
(e.g. Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000).
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It is important to note that whilst longitudinal findings may be consistent with causal
relationships, alternative explanations for longitudinal associations exist (for example,
associations with a third factor that explains both variables). Future research should employ
both experimental studies and analyses of clinical change. Two studies to date have examined
the change in anxious cognitions following cognitive-behavioural treatment for child anxiety
with somewhat different results (Creswell, Schniering and Rapee, 2005; Waters, Wharton,
Zimmer-Gembeck and Craske, 2008). Whilst both studies found reductions in “anxious
cognitions” from pre-to post treatment assessments, Creswell et al. found a reduction in
threat interpretation (amongst 7–15 year olds) which was not replicated by Waters et al. (8–
12 years). They did not find a reduction in threat interpretation, but did find an increase in
children’s beliefs about their ability to influence events. Furthermore, Waters et al. reported a
moderate association between change in influence cognitions and change in anxiety. The fact
that a change in threat cognitions was only found in the study including adolescent children
is intriguing in the light of the above discussion and highlights the importance of evaluating
age effects in future research.
These findings and their implications need to be considered in the light of limitations
of the study. The first limitation concerns generalizability. All participating children were
recruited from schools in a single inner-London borough that represents a diverse population;
this was not a clinic sample, and few children would be considered to show clinically
significant anxiety. The possibility of non-linear effects and, specifically, whether the findings
extend to clinical populations, requires further exploration. Whilst the rate of participation
was low, importantly participants did not differ from non-participants on those demographic
characteristics that were associated with anxiety symptoms (gender and ethnicity). We also
focused specifically on interpretation of ambiguity; further exploration of other aspects of
information processing known to be associated with anxiety is warranted (e.g. Hadwin
et al., 2006). The sample sizes in the current study were too small to permit more complex
longitudinal analyses such as structural equation modelling and latent growth curve models;
nor did we have adequate power to detect interactions. Additionally, the final sample size
would not allow for the detection of small-medium effects within the regression analyses
employed and, as such, there is a possibility of Type II error and findings should therefore
be regarded as preliminary. Like Muris et al. (2004) findings may also have been limited
by the absence of a clear change in anxiety symptoms over the assessment period. Whilst
we studied the children over a longer time period and included a significant life-event (the
transition to secondary school), the means analysis cast doubt on the transition to secondary
school as a general stress. The suggestion that the link between cognitive bias and anxious
affect may be accentuated during periods of transition or vulnerability therefore requires
further investigation, particularly more systematic assessment of cognitive bias around other
normative and non-normative stresses (e.g. parental divorce) at specific child ages. Finally, as
is commonly the case in research into anxiety and interpretation biases, all measures were
based on child self-report. Future studies would benefit from more objective assessments
of anxiety and interpretation that may be less prone to single informant bias. Balancing
these limitations were a number of strengths, including the three occasions of measurement,
assessment of anxiety symptoms and cognitions using multiple measures, and the issue of
standard cognitive assessments of cognitive bias in children.
The current study provides further support for the association between children’s
interpretation biases and self-reported anxiety and stability of cognitions in late childhood.
202 C. Creswell and T. G. O’Connor
In addition, the study adds new information about the predictive role of cognitions in
relation to change in anxiety over a 1-year period. More broadly, the study adds preliminary
developmental data to the research on how characteristic “thinking styles” may precede
change or respond to change in anxiety symptoms over time.
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